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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 7862 
LEO MILLS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Leo Mills, defendant and appellant herein, was charged 
with the crime of carnal knowledge. His trial was had before 
a judge and jury in the Third District Court. By a unanimous 
verdict the jury found defendant guilty as charged, and judg-
ment was entered by the court accordingly. 
Appellant attacks the verdict as being contrary to the pre-
ponderance of the evidence. He avers the jury disregarded the 
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Court's instructions numbers five, six and nine. He further 
alleges that the verdict was the result of passion and prejudice. 
The prosecutrix at the- time of the· offense in question 
was a girl seventeen years of age. (Tr. 41). She testified that 
on the night of October 29th, 1951, defendant took her, in his 
car, to a place near the eastern terminus of 21st South Street, 
in Salt Lake City, where "he made me take off my pants and 
get in the back seat of the car." (Tr. 51). Defendant at this 
time had sexual intercourse with prosecutrix, rupturing the 
hymen. (Tr. 46-53, 53-56). 
S:r'ATEMENT.OF POINTS 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
VERDICT. 
II. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE JURY DISRE-
GARDED THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS. 
Ill. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE VERDICT IS 
:')BASED ON PASSION AND PREJUDICE. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
VERDICT. 
Appellant attacks the verdict as being contrary to the pre-
ponderance of the evidence. In State v. Montgomery, 3 7 Utah 
515, 109 P 815, a case where a conviction of carnal knowledge 
was upheld, the court at page 816, said: 
* * * Concerning the contention that the judg-
ment is not sustained by sufficient evidence, it is suffi-
cient to say that the evidence with regard to the sexual 
act is in direct conflict. The prosecutrix most emphatic-
ally stated in her testimony that the appellant, on or 
about the 16th day of August, 1908, had sexual inter-
course with her while she and he were out riding to-
gether in his buggy; that she never had sexual inter-
course with any one else either before or after the act 
in question, while appellant, upon the other hand, jusc 
as emphatically denies such intercourse either on th~t 
occasion or at any other time. There are some facts 
in evidence which, to some extent, tend to corroborate 
the prosecutrix, while the evidence in corroboration of 
appellant's claims is much stronger. In view of the cir-
cumstances there is no escape from the conclusion that 
neither the prosecutrix nor the appellant could be mis-
tanke with regard to whether the sexual act took place 
or not. They either had or did not have the sexual inter-
course as testified to .by the prosecutrix. This, no doubt, 
is the view the jury entertained, and thus concluded 
that, under all the circumstances, the statements of the 
prosecutrix were more worthy of belief than were those 
of the appellant and his witnesses, none of whom, 
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1 
I 
except the appellant, were present when the alleged 
offense was committed. 
* * * 
* * * If there is substantial evidence in support of 
the verdict, we are powerless to interfere with it, except 
upon questions of law. This is the clear import of our 
Constitution and has become the settled policy of this 
court as appears from the following, * * * (Citing 
Cases). 
The evidence in the instant case is in direct conflict with 
regard to the sexual act. Prosecutrix testified that defendant 
had sexual intercourse with her. At page fifty-one of the record 
she says: 
A. Well, after I got in the back seat he took off his 
pants, and then got on top of me. 
Q. Did he have sexual intercourse with you at that 
·time? 
A. Yes, I could feel something go in at that time, and 
it hurt a lot. 
The testimony of Dr. Joseph R. Evans, corroborates prose-
cutrix as to the fact of copulation. (Tr. 55). 
MR. OLIVER: Yes, I will stipulate to the testimony 
of the doctor. 
·~· MR. TUFT: May it be stipulated Dr. Joseph R. Evans, 
\ a medical doctor, with offices and his practice in 
' 
11 Salt Lake City - if he were called on behalf of 
the State he would testify that on the morning of 
October 30, 1951, he performed an examination 
1 of the person of [prosecutrix], at his office; that on 
r \l said examination he found that there had been a 
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rupture of the hymen; that there was an inflama-
tion of the cervix; and that he found both in the 
interior and exterior of her body substances which 
appeared to him to be at that time male sperma-
tozoa; that he took from the body of (prosecutrix] 
samples of said specimens and submitted them to 
a laboratory for examination; that the laboratory 
report returned to him showed that in truth and 
fact the said substances were male spermatozoa; 
that from his examination he concluded that the 
said [prosecutrix] had engaged in an act of sexual 
intercourse. 
Prosecutrix also positively identified defendant as the man 
who had sexual intercourse with her on the night in question. 
(Tr. 47-52). 
Defendant testified that he did not have sexual inter-
course with prosecutrix on the night in question, nor had ever 
had intercourse with prosecutrix. (Tr. 74). 
Appellant testified that he was at home the night of the 
offense, and that he left for California on a vacation early in 
the morning of the next day. (Tr. 63-71). This story, appel-
lant claims is corroborated by the testimony of Mrs. Mills, his 
wife. She testified that she was home with defendant the 
night of the offense and that he left for California about four 
o'clock the morning of October 30, 1951. (Tr. 59-63). With 
reference to the testimony of Mrs. Mills, the court's attentio~ 
is invited to that of Officer Jackson, who went twice to the 
home of defendant the same night Mrs. Mills says defendant 
was at home. His testimony is as follows: (Tr. 86, 87). 
Q. Are you testifying now you did go to the home of 
the defendant? 
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A. I testify 1 did go to the home· of the defendant. 
Q. At what time? 
A. It was a little after 2:00 dclock, 
Q. Did you gq in tl1e. home? .. 
,I' .,! 
A. I went. to the door of the home. 
Q. Did you· make any observation as to the light or 
darkness? 
A. The home was in darkness. 
-
Q. Did you have occasion to go back again to that 
home on that evening? 
A. I did. 
Q. At what time, Officer Jackson? 
A. It was about 3:00 o'clock. 
Q. And was anyone with you? 
A. Yes, the father of [prosecutrix]. 
Q. Will you state what occured at the time you went 
to the home the second time? 
/ 
A. The second time I went to the home, [the father of 
prosecutrix J was with me. I got out of my car, the 
police car, and went to the door and knocked, and 
when I knocked quite vigorously- I had to knock 
quite vigorously to wake up. the occupants; and 
when I knocked at the door a little while later 
came down to the door Mrs. Leo Mills in .an 
apparel of a kjmona. 
Q. Did you have occasion to inquire as to the where-
a bouts of the defendant? 
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A. I asked Mrs. Mills where the defendant, Mr. Mills, 
was at that time. 
Q. Did you make known who you were? 
A. Yes, Sir. 
Q. And what did she answer you? 
A. She said she was surprised to know where he was. 
She didn't know where he had gone. 
Defendant further relies on the: testimony of Henry Cold-
ing, ( T r. 82-8 5) , Bernard Gordon, ( T r:. 78-82) , and his son, 
Marion Leon Mills, (Tr. 75-78), in attempting to establish 
his presence at his own home the night of the offense. It is to 
be noted that, excepting th testimony of the son, (Tr. 76), none 
of this evidence establishes that it was the night of October 
29th, 1951, that these witnesses saw defendant at his home. 
(Tr. 81, 84). 
From the evidence in this case, which was fully and fairly 
presented to the jury, certainly, we can conclude that there is 
substantial evidence upon which a jury would be justified in 
finding a verdict of guilty. 
Appellant cites three cases which, he claims, support his 
contention, Bufford v. State, 25 Ala. A. 99, 141 So. 359; People 
t'. Keller, 227 Mich. 520, 198 N.W. 939; Williams v. State, 
61 Okla, Cr. Rep. 396, 68 P 2d 530. In the Bufford Case, 
where a conviction for homicide was set aside, the court found 
that the evidence was all circumstantial and that it was "so far 
outweighed by the proven facts, probabilities, presumptions, and 
indisputable exculpating circumstances - that we have reached 
the solemn conclusion that the verdict ought not to be al-
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lowed to stand." In People v. Keller, a statutory rape case, 
it appeared to the court that prosecutrix had an ulterior motive 
for making the charge, that the truth of her story was rendered 
improbable by facts which she admitted, and which were 
fairly established by proof, and that prosecutrix had little regard 
for or appreciation of an oath; therefore, they felt it their 
duty to grant a new trial. The court in the Williams case 
reversed a conviction of rape, because it found that practically 
every witness for the state tended to corroborate the statement 
made by the defendant. 
It is respectfully submitted tht none of the grounds relied 
on for reversal in the cases cited by appellant exist in the 
instant case. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE JURY DIS-
REGARDED THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS. 
Instructions 5, 6 and 9, are stock instructions to the effect 
that the testimony of prosecutrix should be weighed with care, 
that the testimony of defendant should be weighed the same 
as the testimony of any other witness, that passion and pre-
judice have no place in the deliberations of a jury, and that to 
warrant conviction of defendant every reasonable hypothesis 
other than that of the guilt of defendant must be excluded from 
the minds of the jurymen. 
Respondent respectfully submits there is no evidence that 
the jury disregarded the above noted instructions, or any of the 
10 
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instructions submitted_ by the court. Appellant relies only upon 
the evidence given by his own witnesses to sustain his claim. 
This,. we think, we have shown to be insufficient to preclude 
a jury from arriving at a verdict of guilty. Appellant has not 
shown that the jury did not follow the mandate in these 
instructions. 
POINT III. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE VERDICT IS 
BASED ON PASSION AND PREJUDICE. 
Appellant offers no more evidence in support of his Point 
III, than that the prosecutrix is a White girl and defendant 
is a Negro man. The record discloses that defendant was af-
forded a fair and impartial trial. Respondent submits that an 
analysis of the transcript discloses that not only was there no 
effort on the part of the prosecuting attorney to exploit this 
racial difference, but that the judge was particularly attentive 
to the rights of the one accused. Further, no expression of the 
jury appears which could in any way indicate that its verdict 
was the product of passion or prejudice. In t4e absence of any 
appeal to racial prejudice, or to prejudice in any of its forms 
there is no error. 3 Am. fur., Appeal and Error, § 1081 et seq. 
The error alleged by appellant is not supported by the record. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that an analysis of the 
11 
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record and proceedings in this case discloses ample evidence 
upon which the verdict of the jury may rightfully rest, that the 
conviction is proper and should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
RICHARD J. MAUGHAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
12 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
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